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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
l\1ILTON CURTIS
ZUMBRUNNEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-vsJOHN W. TURNER, Warden
Utah State Prison,

Case No.
12754

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Milton Curtis Zummbrunnen, appeals
from a decision of the Third Judicial District Court
denying his release from the Utah State Prison upon a
Petition for a 'Writ of Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On Sq)tember 21, 1971, l\iilton Curtis Zummbrunnen
filed a petition for a ·writ of Habeas Corpus in the
Third .T udicial District Court, Salt Lake County, alleg-
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ing that his committment to the Utah State Prison \ms
invalid. An Amended Petition was filed on K overnber
12, 1971. The matter came on for hearing on .November
18, 1971, before Judge Ernest F. Baldwin, who denied
the Petition on November 29, 1971.
SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Milton Curtis Zumrnhrunnen, seeks the
reversal of the judgment and order of the court below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 5, 1971, in the District Court of \Vasateh
County, State of Utah, appellant plead guilty to the
charge of second degree hmglary.

(Exhibit 1, R. 2"1)

At that change of plea h<'aring, appellant wa::-; represented by counsel, James R Hall. (R. 27) Mr. Hall testified at the habeas corpus hearing that he rrpresented
appellant and four other codcfendants. ( R. 27) Ht> ha cl
het>n

on an appointed basis to l"PJH"esent appellant

and four others in connection with a forg<'ry charge.
(R. 27) He later representPd appelhnt and fonr otll<'rs

on a burg-lary charge. (R 27) Appellant and the otlwrs
asked l\Ir. Hall to repres<>nt them on th<>
they did not

him. (R. -W).

hut

3
At this change of plea hearing on April 5, 1971,
which was the day before the day on which trial was to
be had, appellant plead guilty to second degree burglary
and two other counts of second degree burglary were
dismissed (R. 28, Exhibit 1, pp. 4, 5) One of the codefendants, Mr. Banken, also received the same deal. (Exhibit
1, R. 27) The other three codefendants plead guilty

to grand larceny. (R. 27) Part of the reason for the
deal was so that the other three codefendants would get
some other disposition than pleading guilty to the
second degree burglary charge. (R. 28, 35, 26)
'\Vhen appellant plead guilty to the second degree
burglary, the court asked if anyone had applied any
pressure to get him to plead guilty, or if anyone had
made any promises to him. (Exhibit 1, p. 2) The court
asked appellant if he understood that he had the right
to a trial by jury. (Exhibit 1, p. 1) He was told on two
other occasions that his guilty plea would take the place
of trial by jury. (Exhibit 1, pp. 2, 7) Appellant was
a8krd if he kne"' ,,,hat he was charged with, and H1e
charge was explained to him by the court. (Exhibit 1,
pp. 3, 4-) Appellant was asked his age and was asked
what happened in the matter. (Exhibit 1, pp. 4, 5)
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POINT I.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS BECAUSE HIS GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT
INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED
BECAUSE HE WAS NOT PROPERLY ADYISED OF
ITS CONSEQUENCES.

From the record of the changt> of pl!'a hearing on
April 5, 1971, it is clt>ar that appellant was not adequa·tely infonw·d of and did not kno\\·ingly and int!·lligently waiw his right:::;. 'l'lie record (Exhihit 1) n'vTals
that appellant \ms rna!le awarp of th!• fad this his
guilty plea wonld

tlH• phH'!' of a trial. Hmn•wr,

the l'Pcord i:::; silPnt m: to liis ot1H'r rights that h(' \rniwd

hy Pntering a plea of guilty; that is, his 1irivilegl' agnin:-:t
(•ompulsory :-:Plf-i11crirni11ation m:d liis right to confront
his accusers.

Boyki11 u. Alaluu1111, :l% l '.N.

N. Ct. J 70!),
L.Ed.2d 27+ (19(i9) lwkl that it \ms <'l'l'Ol' on the 11art of
the trial judg(' to <H'<'<'Pt gnilty pl(•a:-: wi tho11t a :-:howi::g
that the pl<'a wa:-: int(•llig<'nt and volt 11tar_\·. TLP l"11il<'li
Stat!':::; Snpn·1tw Court lidd tktl tli(• n•!·ord rn1::-:t sl10\\·
a
of rights, to :-:hm\· if tli!· g·tiilt>· pJ,•n is vol11nL1rily
1

mn<le.
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Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea
of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial.
First, is the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states by reason of the
Fourteenth [citation] Second, is the right to
trial by jury. [citation] Third, is the right to
confront one's accusers. [citation] vVe cannot
presume a waiver of these three important
federal rights from a silent record. 395 U.S. at
243.
The court did ask appellant if any pressure had
been applied to him or if any promises had been made,
but nowhere in the record is it shown that appellant
was made aware of his privilege against self-incrimination or his right to confront his accusers. Now here in
the record is it made apparent that appellant intelligently and knmvingly waived these important rights.
Therefore, under the clear mandate of Boykin v. Alabanw, supra, appellant's plea of guilty was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. As m
Boykin, the judgment must therefore be reversed.
POINT II.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED DENYING APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS BECAUSE HE WAS NOT AFFORDED
THE UNDIVIDED INTEREST AND EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THAT HIS COUNSEL ALSO REPRESENTED FOUR OTHER CODEFENDANTS WITH DIVERGENT INTERESTS.
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Appellant contends that he was not afforded the
undivided interest and assistance of counsel because his
appointed attorney also repre:·wnted four otlwr co-def €ndants with
interests. Tlnrn, there was a
conflict of interest '.vhieh pn•judieNl appdlant and as
a result, his plea fo guiHy was not entned volnntarily,
knowingly, and inklligently, and so should be set aside•.
·without attempting to impugn .Jarnes It Hall, tlw
attorney who repn•senkd appellant, and v,·itlwut attempting to show any incornpetPnce
it is
apparent that .Jir. Hall should not haw n·pn·sented all
five defendants on tlw burg-lary mattPr in Wasatch
County (or should not have been a11pointed to n•presrnt
all fiv<> defendants).
Anwriean Bar Association
Prnjed on Standards for Criminal .Jnstiee, Stnrnlanls
Relating to the> Prosecution Function and the Defrnse
Function ('l'Pnt. Draft, Hareh, 1970) has put forth
standards to be followPd.. In Standard

Conflid (Jf

Interest, it is
(h) Exeept for
maitPrs snch n:-:
initial h<'aring:o, or
for )Jail, n h1\\·:·pJ"
or la\vyers who nn• m;soeiat<·d in practice should
not
to defrnJ n10n thnn one ch•fenclant
in tlw salll(' erirninal cas<· if tlie duty to one of the
rlcfendouts 11w,1; co11flicl 1ritl1 Ilic duly lo a110!l11 :-.
'rlw l)()kntial for eonf'lid of" intPn·.-;t in l'!'J!n'sPntinp; multi1)1<' d<•frndnnts is so gTaV<' tlint
onlinaril:- a
slw11ld d('<·li1w to ad for rnore
than 01w of' SP\'<'; al <·od<'l'<•Jld:nds (·:.:e< pt in ll!t1

1

rnmal situations when, after careful investigation,
it is clear that no conflict is likely to develop and
when the several defondants give an informed
consent to such multiple representation. (emphasis added)
The official commentary to the above standard
states in part:
In many instancPs a given course of action
may be advantageous to one of the defendants but
not m·c('ssnrily to the other. The prosecutor may
he inclined to accept a guilty plea from one of
the codefendanb, either to a }psser offense or
\\·ith a less<•r iwnalty or other consideration, but
this might harm th0 intPrests of the other defendant. The contrast in the disposition of tlwir cases
may have a harmful impact on the remaining
ddendant . . . Defense counsel must necessarily
confront <'a eh with any (·onflieting statements
rnade h.v the other in the course of planning the
<kfonse of the eases. In this situation he may
f'in(l that ht• 1,nrnt 'judge' his clients to determine
\i'hidt is tdling the
and his rol<, as advo'"tt<• \\·oul<l i nevi tn M.v be· und('n11ined as to one
i r not lwth d<·frrnlants.
Fnrtl:'.T. the _\1:wricnn Bar A:::sociation Cocl0 of Profossiond H<·;;;ponsihiliti<'s, adopted h>· this court on Febru1!l, 1!)/1, eontains instruetion n'levant to this

prohkm. In

Rulc> 5-105 (B) it is stakd:
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A lawyer should not continue multiple <c'lllployment if the exercise of his independent
judgment in behalf of a elient will lw or is likely
to he adversely affect('d b)' his rPpresentation o.f
another client, (•xcept to Uw extent iiennitkd
under DR 5-105 (C)
DR 5-105 (C)

In thl· situations eov(•1wl hy DH 3-H(i (A) and

(B ), a lm\'YPl' lllH,\' n']H·es<>nt mnltiplP clients if
it is obvious that lH· c:an adt>quatPly repn•sent the
interest of <•ach a11d if C'ach eonsents to tlie representation after full diselosm(· of tlw possible
effect of such rqll'Psentation on the ex(·rcis<' of
his inde1wndant professional judgment on lwl:alf
of each.

AppPllant's case comes directly within the clictall'S
of the abovP standards. 1t is clear from the very natul'('
of th0 situation that one attorne;' eoulcl not re1iresent
fiye ddenclants, and adyise tlw111 to plead cliffrrentl:r and
lian• all their inten•sts l'.<JUaH:, in rniml. l
clral'l:- conflicted 1rith his

(lllt,\'

duty to oM

to anotlwr. lt is nlso

(']<>;H

that all the defendants did not giye a:1 infon.ie'l eonsf't
after full disclosure of 1li<• possihlP complieations that
('Ould arise from suelt multipl<> n·1n·c's<•ntation. J arn0s
R

Hall t('stifiPd that HIJli<>ll;rnt ns)\e(l ltim to l"('F''-

sent them (tlH• five ckfPndants), lint 1\fr.

\\'ilS

not

pai<l by apyl<'llant and was ind<•<•(l appointc•d ]J;-' tli(• comt.
(R 27) Tlie> n•<·ord dMs not diselo:-c'' tlint on April :>,
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1971, one day before the trial was to be had, that Mr.
Hall had explained the possible conflicts that might
arise.
It is necessary to explore just exactly 'vhat the
conflict of interest was or could have been whether the
'
conflict prejudiced appellant, and whether or not the
judge, the defense attorney, and appellant fulfilled their
roles in regards to exploring the issue of conflict of
interest.
The United States Supreme Court has made it
clear also that an attorney is not to represent conflicting
interests. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct.
457, 86 L.Ed 680 (19-U) In Glasser, it was held that
Glasser's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment
had been infringed over objection, the attorney he had
was appointed by the court to represent his co-defendant.
The Court said that the "Assistence of Counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplated that such
assistance be "untrammeled and unimpaired" by a court
order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously
represmt conflicting interests. Further, the Court said
that
The rip:ht to have the
of counsel is
too fnn<lam<>ntnl and al1osolnte to allow courts to
indulge in nice c.aknlations as to the amount of
1ll'e,indiee ari!,ing from its d0nial. 315 U.S. at
7:i-7 G.
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The Court also pointed out that counsel's 'representation
of Glasser ·was not as effective as it might have been if
the appointment had not been made." Further, the Court
said that "irrespective of any conflict of interest, the
additional hurden of representing another party may
conceivably impair counsel's effectiveness."
The above quoted language has caused some confusion on jus what a "conflict of interest" is. Dual representation may impair effectiveness and thus constitute
a conflict itself.
Some court have hinted that dual representation
may be a conflict in itself. In People v. Chacon, 73 Cal.
Rpts. 10, 447 P.2d 106 ( 1968), the Califoria court said:
lf coumwl must represent conflicting interests
or is ineffec·tiV(--'
of the burdens of representing more lhan mw cld(mdant, the injured
ddendant has be(--'!l clPni<'cl his constitutional right
to effective counsel.

In People v. Robinson, 4-2 Cal. 2d 741, 2(i9 P.2d 6 (193-1:),
the court said that entirPly apart from any factually
apparent diversity of intel'cst, the d<·frndant is entitkd
to the undivided loyalty and untrammeled assistance of
his own counsel. In Commonu:ealth v. iVhift', 21-t Fa.
Super, 26-1, 252 A.2d 20-1 (]9G9), there ·were tltrPe co-dr'fendants. r:J'he defendant pl<'ad guilty to conspiracy,
larePny and
a fir<'arm ·withont a license. lfo
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plead not guilty to burglary, arson, and rece1vmg
stolen property. The second co-defendant plead not
guilty to all charges. The court held that under ,these
facts where two defendants' positions were of variance
(that is, one pleads guilty and one pleads not guilty),
the two defendants may not be represented by the
same counsel. Such a variance, the court held, creates
the possibility of harm that amounts to a conflict.
The California Court of Appeals in People v. Odom,, 236
Cal. App. 2d 876, 46 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1965) set forth
exactly what constitutes a conflict of interest in California. The court said that, among other things a
conflict exists among co-defendants when one defendant
has a record of prior felony convictions and the others
do not.
Some courts state that a conflict need not be shown
to be an actual conflict, but that a potential conflict is
enough to deprive a defendant of the eff Pctive assistance
of counsel. Also, where one defendant is more heavily
involved than the others, there is a sufficient possibility
of conflict of interest to merit
representation.
People 1·. Gellardo, 269 A.C.A. 75, U Cal. Rptr. 572
(1969) The Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, in Glavin
v. United Statrs, 396 F. 2d 725 (9th Cir. 19GS) said in
dicta if tlwre is "some possibility that arlpellants have
diyergent intnPsh; so that one or hoth might not receive
'untrarnnwled and unimpaired' assistance, then ,the denial
of co1msd ':o, i:!otion to he relieyecl from representing one

defendant was reversible error. The court in Kent v.
State, 11 Md.App. 293, 273 A. 2d 819 (1971) held that
the right to counsel is denied if there is an actual conflict of interest or one tha!t is "imminently potential."
It \Vas held in Uuitrd States ex. rel. Small 11. Rundle, 442
F. 2d 235 (3rd Cir. 1971) hat there must be a showing of
a possible conflict of interest, however remote.
\Vhile it is true that most conflict of interest sitnations arise during trial, it is apparPnt from appdant's
case that conflicts of interest can arise prior to trial and
evidence tlwmselves at the stage of the plea. In appellant's case, the fact that tlwre \verp fivP eodefendants in
a burglary charge itself leads one to the conclusion that
all codef Pndants \rnuld not be equally involved. Pro ple
i·. Grllar.do, s11pm, noted ,that this in itself may lw
enough to warrant
representation. Further,
the attorney, James R. Hall, knew foat appellant had a
prior felon>- record and was on parole from Minnesota.
(R. 28) He (.Mr. Hall) was aware that if app('llant pl<'ad
guilty he would likely go to prison for up to tv.·enty years
and that his chances for prnhation were ver>T remote. (R.
28, 29) The fact one defendant has a prior reeord and
others do not was mention<>d in I'('ople 1'. Odom, supra,
as a condition that makes for f'onmct of interest. In
appellant's eafjP it is dear tlw t l\f r. Hnll could not 11:w0
had tlw lw;ot inten•sts of all dd"mdants

in mill(l.

\\Tliile tlw deal 'rnrkNl ont ma:: ltnvP lwiwfitfrd som0 of
fiv0 eo-df•!rnd:mts, it is e!<•ar tlwt a pp:'ll:mt did nnt
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receive the benefit of the deal. l\Ir. Hall was placed in
the position of making common cause for all defendants
or run the risk of "throwing one clinet to the wolves
to benefit the other." People v. Gellardo, su1Jra. Thus,
the conflict in this case was how to treat all five co-def endan ts. To benefit some, others (appellant included)
had to have their interests sacrified. That is scarcely
the "untrammeled and undivided" assistance of counsel
that is constitutionally required. Under Commonwealth
v. White, supra, it is clear that inconsistent pleas among
co-defendants cannot adequately handled by one counsel
without a conflict of interest.
1

Commonwealth v. White, supra, and reason indicate
that whether or not the matter goes to trial, a conflict of
interest can still exist, especially in a case such as
appellant's where the change of plea was made one day
before the date set for trial and the attorney had made
no effort apparent on the record to withdraw from
representation from some of the co-defendants.
·Once the conflict of interest is established, i·t remains
to explore
or not prejudice must be shown. The
court in Lollar 'V. United States, 37G F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir.
1%7) said that:
It is settled that some prejudice, some conflict of interest resulting from the joint representation rnust exist before one can be said to have
heen cl,·ni( d the
assistance of counsel.
1
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What constitutes sufficient prejudice, lwwever, is
uncertain, some courts apparently requiring a
very strong showing of actual prejudice lcitations], others suggesting the possibility of
prejudice is sufficient . . . [citing Glasser 1;.
United States, "upra] The obvious reason against
insisting on a precise delineation of the prejudice
suffered is that such a task is made difficult
·when one must rely on a cold printed record ...
[referring to the trial record] 37G F.2d at 2-±G
Thus, the court held that
Only where we can find no basis in the record
for an informed speculation that [ddendant's]
rights were prejudicially affected can the conviction stand. :37(i l•'.2cl at 24'l.
In Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (±th Cir. 190G) the
com't held that the defendant need not delineate the
precise manner in which he has been harmed by the
conflict of interest. "The po;ssih!lity of harm is sufficient
to render his conviction invalid." Se(• also, fo1· 'the sainc
rnlf•, Vvhite v. United Staf!'s,
F. 2d S'.22 (5th Cir.
19G8) The Pennsylvania Conrt has hl:'ld that if a confliet
arises, "the mere c•xistencl' of a conflict vitiates tlH'.
proceedings, even though no actual harm
Thi!
potentiality that such harm rrwy ]'('fmlt, rather tlian that
imch harm did rP8ult, fumish<•s the appropriate cl'ill'l'ion." CommomDcalth r:.1'. rel. lVhitli11.r; v. l-l11ssell, .+O!i
Pa. 45, 17(i A. 2d 041,
(J962). Tn Raker 1·. 8f!lf<', :2D:2
So. 2d
(Fla. 19G7). thP conrt h<·ld that if a <'onflid
1

1
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exists, no prejudice need be shown. See generally, Comment, 74 Dick L. Rev. 241 (1969).

If a finding of prejudice is necessary, even though
the conflict of interest exists, it is apparent from the
record that appellant was prejudiced. .Mr. Hall knew
that appellant had a prior record and that he was on
parole from another sitate. .Mr. Hall knew that it was
reasonably certain that appellant would go to prison.
Nevertheless, he allowed appellant to plead guilty to
second degree burglary. There was even some misunderstanding as to just what appellant was charged with and
what he would plead guilty to (Exhibit 1, p. 3), though
the record was finally made clear that appellant knew
he was pleading guilty to second degree burglary. (Exhibi1t 1, pp. 4, 5) It is idle to speculate what would have
happened had appellant had single representation, but it
is almost beyond question that if there had not been t11e
element present of trying to get consideration for the
co-defendants, a guilty plea would not have been entered
where there was almost a certainty that a sentence in
prison would be imposed. Mr. Hall testified that he
wanted to see the girls (the three other co-defendants)
released, even though he was quite certain that appellant
would go to prison in order to accomplish this result.
1

(R. 28) Had appellant had single rf'presentation, this

problem

not liavf' evidf'nced itself, and appellant

would not have heen prejudiced by being the subject of
a dc>al that hem•fitPd others.
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Numerous eases indicate that the trial court and the
defense attorney have obligations to make ·the defendant
aware of the possible conflict of interest and the possible
consequences that may result. There \Vas testimony at
the habeas corpus hearing that 'they" asked J\lr. Hall
to represent them. However, it also made clear that
.Mr. Hall was indeed appointed and was not paid by
appellant nor any of his co-defendants. (R. 27, 40)
From this record it is clear that there was no valid
waiver of the right to counsel. A waiver is an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege, which must be made by a defendant who has
been appraised of his rights and who has an intelligent
conception of the consequences of his act. See .Johnson
n. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461
(1937); Carnlry v Cochra11, :369 1T.S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 88-:l-,
8 L. Ed. 2d 70 ( 1962). The reeord does not indicate that
appellant was made aware of the possible results of a
conflict of interest in accordance ·with the ABA Cock of
Professional Responsibility, DR :'l-1-5 (C), supra If tlw
record does nO't show that
was aware of the
possible difficulties with multiplP represPntation, the
waivPr of the rigbt cannot h(' prC'snrned from a silent
record. See .Johnson v. ZerlJst, supra; Crai,q

1'.

Unitrd

States, 217 F.2d 355 (Gth Cir. 1%5).
Exactly what appellant knc•w as to tlw conflict is
clParly n•lPvant to this issnP of voluntariness of the plea.
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In King v. State, 93 Idaho 87, 456 P.2d 254 (1969), the
court said, -1-50 P. 2d at 259:
\Yhen one .accused person is represented by
eounsel who also represent three co-defendants
on the same charge, it is less likely that the
individual accused will receive the kind of assistance of counsPl which would discriminate between
the individual degrees of involvement in the
alleged crime and their verhaps different legal
consequences. These are matters about which
an accused layman knows little and unless he
is fully and effectivuly informed he may make a
thoughtless plea ... [in preference to a possible
death penalty '.\'hich existed in that case.] Thus,
the type of representation of counsel afforded
[defendant] in the prior proceedings as shown
by this record is quite relevant to the question
whether the guilty plea was made voluntarily and
understandingly.

In Campbell v. United States 352 F. 2d 359 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) the record was silent as to whether the defendants were aware of ,the importance of having separate
attorneys.
When two or more defendants are represented
by a single counsel, tht> [trial court] has a duty
to ascertain whether each dt>fendant has an
awareness of the potential risks of that course
and nevertheless has knowingly chosen it.
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This duty is imposed, the court said, because a layman
is not likely to be aware of his rights so as to object to a
possible conflict of int0rests. The court went on to say
that it cannot be determined, absent inquiry by the trial
judge, whether the attorney has made such an appraisal
or had advised his clients of the risks.
Trial judge sl10uld mah sme that codef endant:::i hav0 affirmativt>ly and intelligently
chosen to b<• represented by tJw same attorney,
and that th<>ir d<'cision on the availability of
counsel.
For the same basic rule that the trial judge should make
sure the defendant is aware of the difficulti0s and intelligently chooses multiple representation. See United
States v. Williams, 429 F. 2d 158 (8th Cir. 1970); ilf cfrrr
1j. United States, 280 A. 2d 527 (D. C. App 1971);
Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110 (2nd Cir. 1968).
The f Pderal cases reaching this result rely on tlrn
Criminal ,Justice Act, 18 F.8.C.

), ·which provid<'S:

The court shall appoint sPparate counsel for
defendants ·who havP such conflieting interests
that they cannot properly lie rt>presented by the
same counsel ...
This statutp n'ally says no more than Glasser

'L'.

United

States, supra; both simply forbid multiple rcprcsrntation when ther0 is a conflict of interest.
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The record does not n•veal that
the trial court
of defense counsel explained the problems associated
with multiple representation. Therefore, it cannot be
presumed that app<-'llant made a knmving and intelligent
clwice to have multiple representation. As a result, as
then::> was a conflict of interest present in the multiple
repre::wntation, and resulting prejudice, appellant was
denied the
ective and undivided assistance of counsel.
Because of this, his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered and should be set aside.

CONCLUSION
For the rrnsons above stated, that appellant did not
entt>r his plea of guilty knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily because he
not pro1wrly advised of the
consequences of his plea and because he 1rns denied the
<'ffeetive and undivided assistance of counsel, appellant
respC'ctfully submits that the judgment and order of the
conrt lwlow be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

DAYID P. RHODE
Attorne.11 for Appellant
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